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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addi-
tion to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video Analysis,
reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight
Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also included
to provide an integrated assessment of each Shuttle mission.
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÷Shuttle Mission STS-45 was launched at 8:13 a.m. local 3/24/92
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1.0 Summary
In addition to the Debris/Ice/TPS assessment, this report
provides an integrated Photographic Analysis of Shuttle
Mission STS-45 with contributions from KSC, JSC, MSFC, and
Rockwell - Downey.
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle
vehicle was conducted on 22 March 1992. The detailed walkdown
of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-I also included the primary flight
elements OV-104 Atlantis (llth flight), ET-44 (LWT 37), and
BI-049 SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies. Facility
discrepancies were worked real-time and no items were entered
into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for resolution prior to vehicle
tanking.
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 24 March 1992. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 viola-
tions. There were no ice/frost or TPS conditions outside of
the established data base. The External Tank exhibited light
condensate on the TPS acreage. Six Ice/Frost Team
observation/anomalies were documented and found acceptable for
launch per the LCC and NSTS-08303. The LH2 umbilical leak
sensor detected no significant hydrogen during the cryoload.
The tubing was successfully removed from the vehicle with no
TPS contact or damage.
A small amount of ice/frost had formed on the aft pyrotechnic
canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area due to an
incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location of the
ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303
criteria. A 4-inch diameter ice/frost formation with venting
(blowing) purge gas was present on the 17-inch flapper valve
actuator access port foam plug forward (top) corner. The
ice/frost formation was acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303.
MPS evaluated the venting/blowing purge gas and deemed the
condition acceptable for launch.
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. Two
ll"x16" Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) thermal protection
blanket sacrificial patches were found southwest of the pad.
No other flight hardware, such as FRSI plugs or tiles pieces,
was found. Launch damage to the holddown posts was minimal.
EPON shim material on the south holddown posts was intact, but
debonded. There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on
any of the south holddown posts. No frangible nut/ordnance
fragments were found. The GH2 vent line had latched properly.
Damage to the facility overall was minimal.
A total of 138 film and video items were analyzed as part of
the POSt launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the
mission. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. The EPON shim
material was pulled loose by the stud. Two ordnance/frangible
nut fragments fell from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole. A 3"x0.75"
debris particle appeared when the vehicle was 18 inches above
the HDP shoe.
The Orbiter RH wing leading edge RCC panel #i0 sustained
impact damage sometime during the mission. OTV camera 066
performed a surveillance scan of the vehicle at T-I hr 42 min
and confirmed the absence of impact damage. Launch films and
high speed photography showed no impacts to this area by
debris, such as the OIS box found in the SSME flame trench,
during liftoff. Analysis of launch still photographs and
original negatives did not reveal any signs of the impacts at
the time of launch. No photography was available to establish
that the RCC panel impact damage had occurred during ascent,
in orbit, or during re-entry.
A section of SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) thermal
protection blanket sacrificial patch material originated near
the 9:00 position on SSME #3, fell aft near SSME #i at T+31
seconds MZT, and separated into two pieces in the SSME plume.
The two SSME DMHS patches were found near the pad after
launch. ET aft dome charring, plume recirculation, and SRB
separation were nominal.
OV-104 was not equipped to carry umbilical cameras. On-orbit
views of the ET after separation taken by the flight crew
revealed a conical shaped feature that may be indicative of
residual hydrogen venting from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. It
appeared to originate from the 4-inch recirculation line
interface area. Venting was also visible near the ET intertank
and appeared to originate from the GUCP area. The only
confirmed anomaly in the intertank area consisted of i0 TPS
divots (4 on the -Y side, 6 on the +Y side) in the LH2 tank-
to-intertank flange closeout. Loss of TPS from this area has
contributed to tile damage on the lower surface of the Orbiter
on previous flights. Orbiter performance, landing gear exten-
sion, wheel touchdown, and vehicle rollout after landing were
normal.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. Both frustums exhibited a total of 22 debonds over
fasteners. No hardware was missing from the RH frustum or
forward skirt that could have caused the damage to RCC panel
#I0 on the Orbiter right wing leading edge. The HDP #7 Debris
Containment System (DCS) plunger was not seated and was
obstructed by a frangible nut half. This was the sixth flight
utilizing the optimized link. Twenty percent of the HDP #8
EPON shim material was lost prior to water impact. A stud
hang-up had occurred on HDP #4 and the stud hole was broached.
The HDP #4 EPON shim material was lost at liftoff (as observed
in the film review).
A detailed post landing inspection of 0V-104 (Atlantis) was
conducted on 2-3 April 1992, at KSC and in the OPF (9th
landing at KSC) . The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 172
hits, of which 22 had a major dimension of one inch or
greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 122 hits, of
which 18 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based
on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous
missions of similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter
TPS debris hits was greater than average and the number of
hits one inch or larger was near average.
An expended NSI detonator with an attached connector coupling
ring from the aft umbilical separation system fell to the
runway when the RH (L02) ET umbilical door was opened. A
coupler retaining ring from the same detonator was found
adhering to some RTV on the inner surface of the RH umbilical
door. ET/Orbiter separation ordnance device plungers EO-1 and
EO-2 appeared to have functioned properly. However, the EO-3
plunger was obstructed by a detonator booster and frangible
nut half. Because of the obstruction of the EO-3 plunger, a
detonator booster from the separation assembly escaped and was
found in the ET door hinge cavity.
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, Orbiter
window polishing compound, SRB BSM exhaust residue, natural
landing site products, organics, and paint. A sample from a
tile damage site indicated paint and an iron-rich material of
presently unknown origin. This data does not indicate a
single source of damaging debris as all of the other materials
have been previously documented in post-landing samples.
Future revision of this document will include a tabular
format of residual results to provide increased sensitivity to
possible trends in debris analytical data.
A total of eleven Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA
candidate, were observed during this mission assessment.
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Team Composition: NASA KSC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC,
LSOC SPC, RI - DOWNEY, HHHSS - MAF,
USBI - BPC, MTI - UTAH
Team Activities:
I) Prelaunch Pad Debris Inspection
Objective:
Areas:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents:
Report :
Identify and evaluate potential debris
material/sources. Baseline debris and
debris sources existing from previous
launches.
MLP deck, ORB and SRB flame exhaust
holes, FSS, Shuttle external surfaces
L- 1 day
OMRSD S00U00.030 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall inspect
the Shuttle and launch pad to identify
and resolve potential debris sources.
The prelaunch vehicle and pad
configuration shall be documented and
photographed.
OMI S6444
Generate PR's and recommend corrective
actions to pad managers.
2) Launch Countdown Firing Room 2
Objective:
_J_eas:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents:
Report:
Evaluate ice/frost accumulation on the
Shuttle and/or any observed debris
utilizing OTVcameras.
MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external
surfaces
T - 6 hours to Launch + 1 hour or
propellant drain
OMRSD S00FB0.005 - Monitor and video
tape record ET TPS surfaces during
loading through prepressurization.
OMI S0007, OMI $6444
OIS call to NTD, Launch Director, and
Shuttle managers. Generate IPR's.
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3) Ice/Frost TPS and Debris Inspection
Objective:
Areas:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents:
Report:
Evaluate any ice formation as
potential debris material. Identify
and evaluate any ORB, ET, or SRB TPS
anomaly which may be a debris source
or safety of flight concern. Identify
and evaluate any other possible
facility or vehicle anomaly.
MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external
surfaces
T - 3 hours (during 2 hour BIH)
OMRSD S00U00.020 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall inspect
the Shuttle for ice/frost, TPS, and
debris anomalies after cryo propellant
loading. Evaluate, document, and
photograph all anomalies. During the
walkdown, inspect Orbiter aft engine
compartment (externally) for water
condensation and/or ice formation in
or between aft compartment tiles. An
IR scan is required during the Shuttle
inspection to verify ET surface temp-
eratures. During the walkdown inspect
ET TPS areas which cannot be observed
by the OTV system.
OMI S0007, OMI $6444
Briefing to NTD, Launch Director,
Shuttle management; generate IPR's.
4) Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection
Objectives:
Areas:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents:
Locate and identify debris that could
have damaged the Shuttle during launch
MLP zero level, flame exhaust holes
and trenches, FSS, pad surfaces and
slopes, extension of trenches to the
perimeter fence, walkdown of the beach
from Playalinda to Complex 40, aerial
overview of inaccessible areas.
Launch + 1 hours (after pad safing,
before washdown)
OMRSD S00U00.010 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall perform
a post launch pad/area inspection to
identify any lost flight or ground
systems hardware and resultant debris
sources. _he post launch pad and area
configuration shall be documented and
photographed.
OMI S0007, OMI $6444
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Report : Initial report to NTD and verbal
briefing to Level II at L+8 hours;
generate PR' s.
5) Launch Data Review
Objective:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents :
Report :
Detailed review of high speed films
video tapes, and photographs from pad
cameras, range trackers, aircraft and
vehicle onboard cameras to determine
possible launch damage to the flight
vehicle. Identify debris and debris
sources.
Launch + 1 day to Launch + 6 days
OMRSD S00U00.011 - An engineering film
review and analysis shall be performed
on all engineering launch film as soon
as possible to identify any debris
damage to the Shuttle. Identify flight
flight vehicle or ground system damage
that could affect orbiter flight
operations or future SSV launches.
OMI S6444
Daily reports to Level II Mission
Management Team starting on L+I day
through landing; generate PR's.
6) SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Inspection
Objective:
Areas:
Time:
Requirements:
Documents:
Report :
Evaluate potential SRB debris sources.
Data will be correlated with observed
Orbiter post landing TPS damage.
SRB external surfaces (Hangar AF,
CCAFS)
Launch + 24 hours (after on-dock,
before hydrolasing)
OMRSD S00U00.013 - An engineering
debris damage inspection team shall
perform a post retrieval inspection
of the SRB's to identify any damage
caused by launch debris. Anomalies
must be documented/photographed and
coordinated with the results of the
post launch shuttle/pad area debris
inspection
OMI B8001
Daily reports to Level II Mission
Management Team. Preliminary report
to SRB Disassembly Evaluation Team.
Generate PR's.
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7) Orbiter Post Landing Debris Damage Assessment
Objective :
Areas :
Time :
Requirements :
Requirements :
Requirement s :
Requirements :
Requirements :
Documents:
Identify and evaluate areas of Orbiter
TPS damage due to debris and correlate
if possible, source and time of
occurrence. Additionally, runways are
inspected for debris/sources of debris
Orbiter TPS surfaces, runways
After vehicle safing on runway, before
towing
OMRSD S00U00.040 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall perform a
prelanding runway inspection to
identify, document, and collect debris
that could result in orbiter damage.
Runway debris and any facility anomal-
ies which cannot be removed/corrected
by the Team shall be documented and
photographed; the proper management
authority shall be notified and
corrective actions taken.
OMRSD S00U00.050 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall perform
a post landing runway inspection to
identify and resolve potential debris
sources that may have caused vehicle
damage but was not present or was not
identified during pre-launch runway
inspection. Obtain photographic
documentation of any debris, debris
sources, or flight hardware that may
have been lost on landing.
OMRSD S00U00.060 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall map,
document, and photograph debris-
related Orbiter TPS damage and debris
sources.
OMRSD S00U00.012 - An engineering
debris damage inspection team shall
perform a post landing inspection of
the orbiter vehicle to identify any
damage caused by launch debris. Any
anomalies must be documented/
photographed and coordinated with the
results of the post launch shuttle/
pad area debris inspection.
OMRSD V09AJ0.095 - An engineering
debris inspection team shall perform
temperature measurements of RCC nose
cap and RCC RH wing leading edge
panels 9 and 17.
OMI S0026, OMI S0027, OMI S0028
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Report : Briefing to NASA Convoy Commander
and generate PR's. Preliminary
report to Level II on the day of
landing followed by a more detailed
update the next day.
8) Level II report
Objective: Compile and correlate data from all
inspections and analyses. Results
of the debris assessment, along
with recommendations for corrective
actions, are presented directly to
Level II via SIR and PRCB. Paper
copy of complete report follows in
3 to 4 weeks. (Ref NASA Technical
Memorandum series).
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3.0 PRE-_ BRIEFING
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was
conducted on 22 March 1992 at 0800 hours with the following key
personnel present:
S. Higginbotham
B. Davis
G. Katnik
B. Speece
B. Bowen
K. Tenbusch
P. Rosado
J. Rivera
M. Bassignani
A. Oliu
A. Biamonte
J. Kercsmar
Z. Byrns
C. Gray
S. Copsey
J. McClymonds
J. Stone
T. Shawa
D. Denaberg
J. Cook
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
NASA - KSC
LSOC - SPC
NASA - JSC
- MAF
_C - MAF
RI - DNY
RI - DNY
RI - LSS
USBI - LSS
MTI - LSS
STI, Ice/Debris Assessment
STI, Ice/Debris Assessment
Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team
Lead, ET Thermal Protection
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
Chief, ET Mechanical Systems
Lead, ET Structures
ET Processing, Debris Assess
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processing, Ice/Debris
ET Processsing
Level II Integration
ET TPS & Materials Design
ET TPS Testing/Certif
Debris Assess, LVL II Integ
Debris Assess, LVL II Integ
Vehicle Integration
SRB Processing
SRM Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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3.1 PI_-_ SSV/PI_D DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 22 March 1992 from 0930 - ii00 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-I also included the
primary flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (llth flight), ET-44
(LWT 37), and BI-049 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging
debris, and vehicle configuration changes.
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by
the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold.
There were no vehicle anomalies.
Bolts were loose on a deck plate near the northwest corner of
the LH2 TSM, on a deck plate immediately south of the northeast
rainbird, and on the LH2 TSM adjacent to the SSME exhaust hole.
Loose debris lay on the MLP zero level under the raised decks
and in the rain gutters on the east and west sides of the MLP
zero level. These discrepancies were corrected real-time by Pad
Operations and no items were entered in S0007, Appendix K.
II
Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical outboard side
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Configuration of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 17-inch flapper valve
torque tool access port TPS plug prior to cryogenic loading
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Pneumatic line protective cap under the Firex water pipe
14 :_i_:_,I_!_ ['.".'
'_L.:._.i:!_5._,'_:.- :_

3 o2 POST DRAIH INSPECTION
The first launch attempt of STS-45 was scrubbed due to hazard-
ous gas detection system reports of both hydrogen and oxygen
leaks (780 ppm and 876 ppm concentrations, respectively) in the
Orbiter aft compartment. Data review and isolation
troubleshooting did not specifically reveal the source of the
leaks. The loading procedure was subsequently changed to remain
in slow fill for a longer period to allow for a more gradual
thermal transient at the LH2 ET/ORB 17-inch disconnect.
The LH2 tank had been filled to 98 percent; the L02 tank had
been filled to approximately 60 percent. A post drain inspec-
tion was performed at Pad 39A from 0900 to 1015 hours on 23
March 1992. Both the SSV and MLP zero level were inspected.
There was no TPS damage, such as divots or cracks, on the L02
tank, intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
The tumble valve cover was intact. There was no damage on the
-Y side of the nosecone, foot print area, and fairing. The +Y
side was not accessible for inspection.
No discrepancies were observed on the bipod jack pad closeouts.
Ice was still present in all of the L02 feedline support
brackets, but there was no evidence of loose foam.
Ice still remained in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut
fairing interfaces and on the EB-7/EB-8 fittings.
Ice fingers, 3.5 inches in length, were still attached to the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents. Ice was also present on the
aft pyrotechnic canister closeout bondline at the 6 o'clock
position and on the 17-inch flapper valve torque tool access
port TPS plug closeout at the forward corner.
Frost/vapors were present on the +Z aft siphon manhole cover
leak check port closeout.
All of the ice/frost conditions were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
There were no apparent TPS anomalies on the SRB's or Orbiter.
One RCS paper cover was entirely missing from the R3D thruster
on the aft +Y RCS stinger.
There were no facility anomalies. The sound suppression water
troughs were nominally configured and filled with water. The
LH2 leak detection tygon tubes for LD54 and LD55 were in the
proper positions.
15

Tumble valve cover was intact. There was no damage on the
-Y side of the nosecone, foot print area, and fairing.
16 [ ' . •
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Ice was present in all of the L02 feedline support brackets,
but there was no evidence of loose foam.
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There were no anomalies on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Note th. _
tygon tube for leak detector LD55 visible above the umbilical
(arrow) .
18 •

Ice was still present on the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout
bondline and on the 17-inch flapper valve torque tool access
port TPS plug closeout at the forward corner.
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One RCS paper cover was entirely missing from the R3D thruster
on the aft RH RCS stinger. The condition was waived for flight.
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4.0
STS-45 was launched at 84:13:13:40 GMT (08:13:40 a.m. local) on
24 March 1992.
4 .1 ICE/FROST I_SPECTIOR
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 24 March 1992 from 0230 to 0435 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations.
There were no conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
63.5 F
67.4 %
17.9 Knots
353 Degrees
The portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanner
radiometer was utilized to obtain surface temperature measure-
ments for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, as
shown in Figure 1 and 2.
4.2 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. The R3D RCS thruster
paper cover was missing. The FID cover was wet, but intact,
with no evidence of a liquid line. The water spray boiler plugs
were intact. Light frost was present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat
shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat shield was dry.
Infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. No GOX vapors
originated from inside the SSME nozzles. No condensate was
present on base heat shield tiles.
4.3 SOLID ROCEET BOOSTERS
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH
SRB case surface temperatures between 59 and 64 degrees F. In
comparison, temperatures measured by the hand-held Cyclops
radiometer ranged from 60 to 66 degrees F and the GEI (Ground
Environment Instrumentation) measured temperatures between 62
and 69 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34
degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean
Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 65 degrees F, which
was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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FIGURE1. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
TIME: 0245 - 0430 EST
DATE: 3124192
VEH. ST_ ,45
57
58
57
54
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
TARGET EMISSIVITY
ASSUMED TO BE 1.0
54
52 52
55 48
59
59
63 63
63 63
62 63
il 63
60
64
61
62
64
64
66
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FIGURE2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
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The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 2330 to 0815 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
There was light condensate but no ice/frost accumulation on the
L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The
STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 58 degrees F on
the ogive and 54 degrees Fahrenheit on the barrel section. In
comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that
averaged 55 degrees F on the ogive and 55 degrees F on the
barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 54 degrees F on the
ogive and 50 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank TPS acreage was dry. No frost spots were present
in the stringer valleys. No unusual vapors or ice formations
were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable
STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 61 degrees F
and the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged
62 degrees F.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate,
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 52
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 56 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 53 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 57 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted
temperatures of 48 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 52
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps,
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. One
small frost spot had formed on the +Y longeron near the thrust
strut interface. Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable
tray-to-upper strut fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered
the lower EB fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with
condensate on the rest of the fitting. The struts were dry.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the LO2 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. Therewere no accumulations of
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
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Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with
condensate.
Isolated ice/frost formations were present on the outboard and
top sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. Ice/frost
fingers 3-5 inches in length had formed on the pyro canister
and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had formed on the aft
pyrotechnic canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area
due to an incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location
of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303
criteria. (The problem exists through end item EI-66. The mold
will be changed to add more foam for EI-67 and subs. An EI spec
waiver will be issued for STS-45 and subs until existing items
are expended). Normal venting of helium purge gas had occurred
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. There were no
unusual vapors emanating from the umbilicals nor any evidence
of cryogenic drips. A ring of frost had formed on the cable
tray vent hole. A 4-inch diameter ice/frost formation with
venting (blowing) purge gas was present on the 17-inch flapper
valve actuator access port foam plug forward (top) corner. The
ice/frost formation was acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303.
MPS evaluated the venting/blowing purge gas and deemed the
condition acceptable for launch.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed
from the vehicle with no flight hardware contact or TPS damage.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies consisted
of 60TV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 documented an ice/frost formation on the LH2 tank
aft dome +Z manhole cover closeout ring. The ice/frost was
adjacent to the apex on the opposite side of the Orbiter. The
condition was acceptable per NSTS-08303. Post drain inspection
revealed no evidence of a defect.
Anomaly 002 recorded numerous frost formations and small
icicles on the north GOX vent duct. The formations decreased in
size as the ambient temperature increased. The condition was
within the experience data base and was acceptable per the
NSTS-08303 criteria.
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets. These ice and
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the LO2 umbilical purge vents and LH2 umbilical purge vents,
purge barrier (baggie), LH2 feedline bellows, and recirculation
line bellows. The ice/frost formations were acceptable per
NSTS-08303.
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Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the +Y and -Y longeron-to-thrust strut interface. The ice
and frost accumulations were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
Anomaly 006, initiated by the Ice Team, documented an ice/frost
formation with blowing (venting) purge gas on the forward
corner of the LH2 umbilical 17-inch flapper valve torque tool
access port TPS plug closeout. The ice/frost formation was
acceptable per NSTS-08303. The vapors and blowing purge gas
were evaluated by MPS and deemed acceptable for launch.
4.5 FEILITT
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was
also no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP.
The GH2 vent line modification prevented ice f=om forming, but
some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP
legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier
plate.
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the
GOX vent hood was retracted. Small icicles less then 3/4-inch
in length had formed on the GOX vent ducts (4 on the south
duct, 7 on the north duct) during cryoload, but had melted
before launch.
28
Overall view of OV-104, ET-44 (LWT 37) , and BI-049 SRB' s.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
violations
29

Only the R3D thruster paper cover was missing from the RH aft
RCS stinger. The cover fell off after the scrub/ET drain and
the condition was waived for launch.
3O
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Light frost and condensate was present on the SSME #2 heat
shield-to-nozzle interface. No condensate had accumulated on
base heat shield tiles.
31

Light condensate, but no ice or frost, had accumulated on the
ET LO2 tank ogive and barrel sections
32
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There were no LH2 tank TPS anomalies. Light condensate, but no
ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
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Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline support brackets and
upper bellows were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
34
_;,GINAL _' ....,;V.l L"
COLC:R _L,r-,T,-..r,,-,_,-.,j__ .-,

/Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline support brackets and
lower bellows were typical

There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice
and frost formations on the purge vents were typical. Normal
venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking,
stable replenish, and launch.

Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. There were no unusual
vapors emanating from the umbilical nor any evidence of
cryogenic drips. Ice/frost accumulations in the recirculation
line bellows, on the burst disks, on the umbilical purge vents,
and on the top/outboard sides of the umbilical were typical.
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Ice/frost formations on the lower plate gap purge vent and in
the LH2 recirculation line bellows were typical. The 17-inch
flapper valve actuator tool access port TPS plug closeout
exhibited a blowing purge gas leak and a 4-inch diameter ice
formation at the forward corner. The ice formation was accept-
able per NSTS-08303. MPS evaluated the venting/blowing purge
gas and deemed the condition acceptable for flight.
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5.0 POST LAITNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPF_r'TTON
The post launch inspections of the MLP, FSS, pad apron, and pad
acreage were conducted on 24 March 1992 from Launch + 1-1/2 to
4 hours. An ll"x16" piece of white, stitched fabric, insulation
material was found in the southwest quadrant of the pad near
the box cars/trailers. The material was positively identified
as a Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) thermal protection blanket
sacrificial patch. The sacrificial patch was made out of AB-312
ceramic fiber material (ref Attachment I) . No other flight
hardware, such as FRSI plugs or tiles pieces, was found.
SRB holddown post erosion was typical. All south HDP EPON shim
material was intact, but significantly debonded. The sidewall
and bottom plate EPON shim material on HDP #6 was completely
debonded. There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on
any of the south holddown posts. The north post doghouse blast
covers were in the closed position and three of the covers
exhibited minimal erosion. The HDP #3 doghouse blast cover
sustained a crack i0 inches long. The SRB aft skirt purge lines
were in place but slightly damaged. The RH SRB T-0 umbilical
exhibited minor damage. Four electrical connector savers on the
LH SRB T-0 umbilical were protruding and damaged.
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount
of damage. The GH2 vent arm was latched on the eighth tooth of
the latching mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract
lanyard). The GH2 vent line appeared to have retracted normally
and showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement. The ET
intertank access structure also sustained typical plume heating
effects.
Damage to the facility appeared to be less than usual and
included:
i. An FSS 155 Foot Level sign was found on the 115 foot
level.
2. An FSS 235 Foot Level sign was found on the 215 foot
level.
3. Insulation on the north GOX vent duct was torn.
4. An OIS box and an 8"x14" metal panel lay in the south
flame trench near the flame diverter. The OIS hardware
originated from station 1-17 on the south side of the
MLP (near the LH2 skid beneath the overhang). The
attach hardware had failed due to corrosion/rusting.
The OIS box most likely shook loose from the vibration
of launch as the vehicle cleared the tower. Pad Ops
will inspect the pad OIS boxes for similar problems.
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage.
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ATTACHMENT 1
Match 26, 1992
TO: Frmk l_ierdo
FROM: Hal $oto
SUBJECT: _LATION WItAf_IENT I_UND IN PAD.A AwrER _[_:_Udk[_[
The fraffment ofimulatton found within the Pad-A pmimuter _ launch of_1_..45 can be poMtively
idemtfled as a Drone Mcmmed Heat _Meld (DMI_) thmmai protection blanket mcdficiM patch. This
sacrificial patch is made out of AB-312 material (ceramic fabdc) and ts intended to protect the weak
facin8 matmial (S-Glare) of the teal 611 DME_ blanket deMffa.
Because the S-Glass fabric material is not suen8 enough to withstand the flutterin 8 and acoustic loads
of flight, the 611 Blmket8 bare been coveted with a series of eisht sacrificial patches per DMHS half.
This sacrificial patch conflsumtion has proven effective in protecting the orlsina1611 blanket from
detrbnental dama8e, and it has been approved and accepted as an effective and reliable repair and
prmectiou tecim/que by the Matedal Review Bored.
The sacrificial patch comtsts of a double layer of AB-312 fabric matmtal with a one square.lnch grid
stitch pattern sewn tlmmgh the emtre patch as _mctmal mppmt. They are sewn to the blanket all around
the edlgm ami also with utck stitches tineusb the emire cmm-ucttomd width of the blanket to hoM im
centertotbe_ See figure 1.
In the past it has been necemmy to replace tbe patches that mffeted the greatest damage from flight
during mbiter tmmmmnd while at the Orbiter Processing Facility.Thisdamqle lacledu tearing and
fray/nl of the fabflc in various degrees, v-mryin8 titan light to extensive damase. Some sacrificial patches
have been found to be detada_ smnettmea from two, up to tlnee edse8, but nev_ found to be _$ or
nearly completely detached fxem the 611 blinker.
Because all Mx DMHS blmlkew (two halves per engine position) me covmed and protected entirely
with eight sacrificial patches (each), it is impomible at this moment to tell the exact position that the
sacriflchd patch came from. However, it cm be lmxticted that 8t the worst case we have the Centchrome
insulating batting material of the blinker miming in this spot since the protective fac_fg material
(S-GLASS) is expected to be sevmely dmmsed or mlntaS.
We have found misMn 8 Cerachrmue insulatin 8 battln 8 material in the past. However, no thermally
induced damase has been tecmded on the DMI.I_ structure or hereby SSMB powezbead components due
to the mimln 8 battin 8 material.
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An inspection of the beach from Pad 39B to the Titan complex
revealed no flight hardware or TPS materials.
Inspection of the pad was completed on 26 March 1992 along
with the areas outside the pad perimeter, railroad tracks, the
beach from UCS-10 to the Titan complex, the beach access road,
and the ocean areas under the vehicle flight path. A second
DMHS thermal protection blanket sacrificial patch (ll"x16" in
size) was found during the aerial inspection. The material was
located southwest of the pad outside the perimeter fence
approximately 700 feet from the location of the first piece.
Both pieces were in line with the prevailing wind at launch
time.
MLP-3 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at
the bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits.
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separa-
tion (due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume).
Most of the signal registrations were very weak and often
barely detectable, which generally compares with the types of
particles detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 60
particles were imaged in the T+141.4 to 331.5 second time
period. Thirty-one of the particles were imaged by only one
radar, 25 particles were imaged by two radars, and four par-
ticles were imaged by all three radars.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section i0.
42
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Two pieces of SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) thermal
protection blanket sacrificial patches, each measuring ll"x16",
were found southwest of the pad apron. Film review showed the
patches falling aft of the SSME area at 31 seconds MET.
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Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. EPON
shim material was intact, but significantly debonded. There was
no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south
holddown posts.
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The sidewall and bottom plate EPON shim material on HDP #6
was completely debonded
45

North HDP blast covers were in the closed position and
exhibited typical SRB plume erosion effects
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An OIS box and an 8"x14" metal panel lay in the SSME flame
trench south of the flame divertor. The OIS hardware originated
from the LH2 skid on the south side of the MLP. The attach
hardware had failed due to corrosion/rusting.
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6 o0 FILM RL'v'r_EN AND PRO_ REPORTS
A total of 138 film and video data items, which included
fifty-nine videos, fifty-one 16ram films, twenty-four 35ram
films, and four 70mm films were reviewed starting on launch
day.
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were
presented to the MissionManagement Team, Shuttle managers, and
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in
Section I0.
6.1 LAUNCH FILM _ VIDEO
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
Helium purge vapors and ice build-up on the LH2 ET/ORB umbili-
cal had been typical during tanking, stable replenish, flight
pressurization, and launch. There were no unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips (OTV 009, 054, 063).
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile
appeared normal. Free burning hydrogen drifted upward to the
OMS pods (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 051, 063).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. No damage to Orbiter tiles or ET TPS
was visible (OTV 009, 054, 063, 064). Some pieces of ice
contacted the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward.
No tile damage was visible. Pieces of ice continued to fall
from the umbilical area after liftoff.
SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused the loss of tile
surface coating material from three locations on the base heat
shield and another location near the LH OMS nozzle heat shield
(E-19, 20, E-23).
Several ice particles fell from the LO2 feedline bellows and
support brackets, but did not appear to contact the vehicle
(E- 65) .
Light frost was present in the southwest (-Y) ET GOX vent
louver. There was no TPS damage to the ET nose cone acreage,
footprint, or fairing (OTV 061, 062). ET tip deflection of
approximately 32 inches was typical (E-79).
A bright flash near the exit plane of SSME #3 at the time of
liftoff was caused by a reflection on the residual GOX cloud
from the LO2 T-0 umbilical disconnect, which was drawn aft and
around the SSME nozzle by plume aspiration (OTV 051, 070, 071).
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The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 049, 063). A bright flash near the LH2
T-0 umbilical was caused by a reflection of the TSM camera
light on the flight QD and residual GH2 vapors (OTV 063). GUCP
disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (OTV 004). The
GH2 vent arm retracted and latched properly. There was no
excessive slack in the static retract lanyard (E-31, 33, 41,
42, 50). Separation of the SRB T-0 umbilicals from the aft
skirts was nominal. The separation planes remained generally
parallel during retraction (EX2, EX3). Film item E-60 confirmed
that water flowed properly from all MLP rainbirds.
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. The EPON shim bottom and
sidewall material was pulled loose by the stud (E-7) . Two
pieces of ordnance/frangible nut debris fell from the HDP #7
DCS/stud hole. A 3"x0.75" debris particle appeared when the
vehicle was 18 inches above the HDP shoe (E-28).
The Orbiter RH wing leading edge RCC panel #i0 sustained impact
damage sometime during the mission. OTV camera 066 performed a
surveillance scan of the vehicle at T-I hr 42 min and confirmed
the absence of impact damage. Launch films and high speed
photography showed no impacts to this area by debris, such as
the OIS box found in the SSME flame trench, during liftoff.
Analysis of launch still photographs and original negatives did
not reveal any signs of the impacts at the time of launch. No
photography was available to establish the RCC panel impact
damage occurred during ascent, in orbit, or during re-entry.
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings.
Pieces of ET/ORB purge barrier baggie material were also
visible caught in the aerodynamic recirculation and falling aft
of the vehicle (E-54, 59, 212, 213, 223). A white object fell
out of the SRB plume at GMT 13:14:27.497 (E-222).
A section of SSME closeout blanket patch material originated
near the 9:00 position on SSME #3 and fell aft near SSME #I at
13:14:11.286 GMT (E-59, ET-212, ET-213, TV-4A). It separated
into two pieces (E-212 frame 2050, E-213, E-222) in the SSME
plume. This material is most likely the two pieces of SSME
closeout blanket patch material found near the pad after
launch.
An orange flash occurred in the SSME plume during ascent at GMT
13:14:18.334 (E-54, 222).
Movement of the body flap appeared similar in amplitude and
frequency to that observed on previous flights (E-207, 212).
49
ET aft dome outgassing and charring was typical. Three
instances of plume brightening, which have been observed on
previous flights, occurred during tailoff. SRB separation
appeared normal (OTV 048, TV-13, E-204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
223).
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A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. The vehicle "walked" to the
north and caused the stud to remain extended until clear of the
aft skirt, at which point it "twanged" from side to side and
eventually fell into the holddown post.
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The EPON shim bottom and sidewall material was pulled loose by
the stud. The shim pieces fell into the SRB exhaust hole
without contacting the vehicle.
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Two pieces of ordnance/frangible nut debris fell from the
HDP #7 DCS/stud hole (arrows)
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A 3.0"x 0.75" NSI booster fell from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole
when the vehicle was 18 inches above the HDP shoe
54
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Two pieces of SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) sacrificial
patches originated from SSME #3 and fell aft at 31 seconds MET
55 r ....

6.2 ORBIT FILl( J_D VIDEO
Views of the External Tank after separation from the Orbiter
consisted of one 16ram film and 38 still 70ram frames. OV-104 was
not equipped to carry umbilical cameras.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern•
A conical shaped feature that may be indicative of residual
hydrogen venting from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to
originate from the 4-inch recirculation line interface area.
Venting was also visible near the ET intertank and appeared to
originate from the flight umbilical carrier plate area. The
only confirmed anomaly in the intertank area consisted of I0
TPS divots (4 on the -Y side, 6 on the +Y side) in the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout. Loss of TPS from this area
has contributed to tile damage on the lower surface of the
Orbiter on previous flights•
There were no apparent anomalies on the L02 tank, LH2 tank, and
aft dome TPS acreage. A possible divot was visible on the aft
dome between the two manhole covers. The BSM burn scars were
typical. The nosecone, intertank access door, GH2 umbilical
carrier plate, ET/SRB forward attach points, and RSS antennae
were in nominal configuration.
There were no apparent anomalies that may have contributed to
the impact damage on the Orbiter right wing leading edge RCC
panel #I0.
6.3 _IlqG FILM KND VIDEO
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and
final approach appeared nominal• Main landing gear deployment
and touchdown was normal. Nose rotation and touchdown of the
nose landing gear was smooth. Some tile damage on the Orbiter
nose below the RH RCS thrusters was visible during the rollout.
Infrared data of the Orbiter during final approach and touch
down showed no anomalies.
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Exposure-adjusted views of the External Tank shortly after
separation from the Orbiter show a conical shaped feature
believed to be residual hydrogen venting from the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical 4-inch recirculation line interface area.
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t
Faint trace of vapor (arrow) is believed to be venting of
residual hydrogen from the flight umbilical carrier plate area
shortly after the External Tank separated from the Orbiter.
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View of the External Tank -Y side showed 4 divots in the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout. There were no anomalies on
the LO2 tank, intertank, and LH2 tank TPS acreage.
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View of External Tank +Y side showed 6 divots in the LH2 tank-
to-intertank flange closeout. Loss of TPS from this area has
contributed to tile damage on the lower surface of the Orbiter
on previous flights.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIG_T/I__ D_S _SSI_IqT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 26 March 1992 from 1430 to
1630 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in
excellent condition.
7. I RH SOLID _T BOOSTER DEB_IS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 10 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners (Figure 4). The Hypalon paint was severely blistered
and peeling the full circumference of the 395 ring frame and
around the BSM's. The blisters averaged 2-3 inches in diameter
and were generally ruptured. Layers of MTA adhered to the
peeled Hypalon paint. PR PV6-214863 was taken to investigate
the problem. All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in the
fully opened position. No hardware was missing from the frustum
that could have caused the damage to RCC panel #i0 on the
Orbiter right wing leading edge.
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS
(Figure 5). The phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were
intact though the phenolic plate material on the +Z antenna was
delaminated. The forward separation bolt and electrical cables
appeared to have separated cleanly. No pins were missing from
the frustum severance ring. No hardware was missing that could
have caused the damage to RCC panel #I0 on the Orbiter right
wing leading edge.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the
FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting
from severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and all three aft booster stiffener
rings appeared undamaged. A 6"x3" area of TPS on the forward
side of the upper strut fairing at the separation plane was
missing and the substrate was charred. The loss of TPS in this
area may have occurred during strut separation. RTV-133
closeout around the outboard aft IEA covers did not adhere
completely to the cover/ETA ring interface and may be an
application problem. A PR was taken to investigate this occur-
rence. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing prior to water
impact.
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The phenolic material on the kick ring had delaminated.
Several K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt heads on the
aft side of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact
(sooted substrate). K5NA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles
(Figure 6). The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good
condition. Squawk 45-011 was taken against two 1-inch gashes
in the MSA-2 over fastener sealant two feet to the outboard
side of the triple BSM housing. Slight sooting covered both
areas. One theory suggested the gashes were caused by the same
particles that had impacted the Orbiter RCC panel #I0 on the
right wing leading edge. Two MSA-2 samples were removed for
evaluation, which revealed no charring or heat effects under
the layer of sooting. The investigation concluded that the
gashes occurred during SRB re-entry and descent and were not
related to the Orbiter wing impact.
All Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
properly. This was the sixth flight utilizing the optimized
link. A stud hang-up had occurred on HDP #4 and the stud hole
was broached. The HDP #4 EPON shim material was pulled off at
liftoff by the stud (as observed in the film review).
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had i0 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. The Hypalon paint was severely blistered and peeling
the full circumference of the 395 ring frame and around the BSM
area.
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The Hypalon paint blisters averaged 2-3 inches in diameter and
were generally ruptured. Layers of MTA adhered to the peeled
Hypalon. Lab tests showed the blistering occurred during SRB
re-entry.
67 i : • i I
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!The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both
RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. No hardware was
missing from the forward skirt that could have caused the
damage to the RCC panel #i0 on the Orbiter right wing leading
edge.
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A 6"x3" area of TPS on the forward side of the upper strut
fairing at the separation plane was missing and the substrate
showed signs of heating. The loss of TPS may have occurred
during strut separation.
7O
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The phenolic material on the kick ring had delaminated. Several
K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt heads on the aft side
prior to water impact (sooted substrate) .
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Two 1-inch gashes in the aft skirt MSA-2 occurred during SRB
re-entry and descent, according to lab tests, and were not
related to the RCC panel #I0 impact damage on the Orbiter wing.
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A stud hang-up had occurred on HDP #4 and the stud hole was
broached. The EPON shim material was pulled off at liftoff by
the stud.
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7.2 I,B SOLID ROCI_'T BOOSTER. DEBRIS ZIqSP_'-_ZOW
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 12 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. The largest debond measured 3"x2" and was located
between the -Y and +Z axes near the 381 ring frame. There was
minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint (Figure 7).
The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened
position. However, three of the cover attach rings had been
bent at the hinge by parachute riser entanglement.
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact (Figure 8).
The forward separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to
have separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred
near the ET/SRB attach point.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI
cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of
the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, IEA, ETA ring, and all three aft booster stiffener
rings appeared undamaged. A 3"x0.5" area of TPS on the forward
side of the upper strut fairing at the separation plane was
missing and the substrate was charred. The loss of TPS in this
area may have occurred during strut separation. RTV-133
closeout around the outboard aft IEA covers did not adhere
completely to the cover/ETA ring interface and may be an
application problem. A PR was taken to investigate this occur-
rence. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing prior to water
impact.
Two K5NA protective domes were missing from bolt heads on the
aft side of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact
(charred substrate). KSNA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles
(Figure 9). The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good condition.
The HDP #7 Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger was not
seated and was obstructed by a frangible nut half. This was the
sixth flight utilizing the optimized link. There was no sign of
broaching in any of the stud holes. Twenty percent of the HDP
#8 EPON shim material was lost prior to water impact.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 12 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. The largest debond measured 3"x2" and was located
between the -Y and +Z axes near the 381 ring frame.
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The LH forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds or missing TPS.
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Post flight condition of the segment cases, factory joints,
and field joints was normal
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Post flight condition of the LH aft booster/aft skirt. The aft
skirt acreage TPS was sooted but generally in good condition.
The ET/SRB aft struts, IEA, ETA ring, and all three aft booster
stiffener rings appeared undamaged.
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7.3 _ S--_ DISASSI_mLY FIq_)INGS
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS)
housings revealed an overall system retention of 87 percent and
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed:
% of Nut without % of Ordnance
HDP # 2 large halves fragments % Overall
1 99 99 99
2 99 98 99
3 99 94 99
4 99 87 97
5 99 99 99
6 99 99 99
7 8 13 8
8 99 99 99
STS-45 was the sixth flight to utilize the new "optimized"
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance
debris. Overall percentages of retention for the five previous
flights utilizing the "optimized" link are:
BI-044 BI-045 BI-046 BI-047 BI-048
HDP # STS-40 STS-43 STS-48 STS-44 STS-42
1 99% 98% 99% 99% 99
2 99% 31% 88% 99% 98
3 38% 99% 99% 99% 99
4 99% 99% 99% 99% 99
5 23% 99% 58% 99% 99
6 99% 99% 99% 99% 99
7 62% 99% 99% 99% 99
8 99% 99% 99% 99% 99
TOTAL 77% 90% 92% 99% 99%
Debris 58 oz 25 oz 19 oz negl negl
Loss
MSFC/USBI performed an analysis (ref No. M&P-3033-045-92) on
samples of the RH frustum blistered Hypalon paint and adhering
MTA layers. The Hypalon blistering has been limited to those
areas with an MTA substrate. Although the blistering had not
occurred on the LH frustum, the investigation found both of the
frustums had been processed at approximately the same time and
in the same thermal environment. Measurements of the Hypalon
paint applied to the RH frustum MTA was 13 mils thick (8 mils
minimum is required) compared to an average thickness of 35
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mils on the RH frustum MSA-2 acreage and 55 mils average
thickness on the LH frustum MTA and MSA-2 acreage. No anomalies
were found with the Hypalon constituents or application proce-
dures. The report concluded the RH frustum MTA exhibited
elevated levels of thermal decomposition and gas evolution (in
the thermal environment of re-entry/descent), which could not
be contained by the relatively thin layer of Hypalon and
resulted in the blistered condition.
The RTV-133 closeout around the outboard aft IEA covers had not
adhered completely to the cover/ETA ring interface. A Problem
Report determined the adhesion anomaly was caused by the method
of application. Deviations to the application procedure were
written and the closeouts on the STS-49 vehicle were reworked
prior to launch.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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8.0 ORBITER POST L,_JqDXNG DEBRIS _SESS_._BI_T
A post landing debris inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was
conducted on April 2 and 3, 1992, at the Kennedy Space Center
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) on runway 33 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility Bay #i. This inspection was performed to
identify debris impact damage, and if possible, debris
sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 172 hits, of
which 22 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust
plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statis-
tics from 30 previous missions of similar configuration
(excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42,
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates that
the total number of hits is greater than average and the
number of hits one inch or larger is near average. Figures
10-13 show the TPS debris damage assessment for this mission.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 122 hits, of
which 18 had a major dimension of one inch or greater.
Thirty-seven hits, of which seven had a major dimension of one
inch or greater, were located along the forward one-quarter of
the lower right surface. Some of these hits may have been
caused by ice from the External Tank LO2 feedline brackets and
bellows. One damage site in tile V070-391015-211 contained an
embedded debris particle. A chemical analysis was performed on
this particle and the results are presented in Section 9.0.
The following table shows the STS-45 Orbiter debris damage by
area:
HITS > i"
Lower surface 18 122
Upper surface 1 41
Right side 0 2
Left side 0 0
Right OMS Pod 2 2
Left OMS Pod 1 5
TOTALS 22 172
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered
to be in good condition for a KSC concrete runway landing.
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FIGURE 10.
I I/2 x i 3/8 x 1/16
3 HITS _ I INCH ON
INBOARD SIDE OF
ELEVON
1 X 1/4 X 1/4
STS-45
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
,1 HIT _ 1 INCH ON INBOARD
SIDE OF ELEVON
1/2 X 1/2 X 3/8
7 HITS WITH ONE _ i INCH
(1 i/8 X 1/2 X 3/8)
Z
3
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4 1/4 X i 3/4 X 3/8
2 i/2 X 3/4 X 1/16
TOTAL HITS= 122
HITS TM1 INCH - 18
NOTE: ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
1 3/4 X 3/4 X I/8
i 1/2 X i/4 X 1/16
1 1/2 X 3/4 X 1/8
2 3/4 X 3/4 X 1/8
2 5/8 X 3/4 X 1/4
5 HITS WITH ONE _ 1 INCH
(1 1/4 X I X i/8)
9 HITS WITH ONE Z 1 INCH
(I 3/4 X 3/4 X 1/8)
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1X 3/8 X i/8
1 318 x I x i14
3 HITS WITH ONE _ 1 INCH
(5 X 1 3/4 X 3/8)
2 X 5/8 X I/4
5 HITS WITH ONE _ I INCH
(2 3/4 X 1 3/8 X 1/4)
FIGURE 11.
STS-45
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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m
1X I/2 X 3/8
1 1/8 X 1 1/4 X 1/4
F
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NOTE: ALL MEASUREMENTS
IN INCHES
TOTA L H ITS = 4
HITS--> 1 INCH = 2
STS-45
FIGUR_12.DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
A
i
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/IlL MEASUREMENTS IN INCHES
1-3/4 x 5/8 x 1/4
TOTAL HITS = 5
HITS > 1 INCH= 1
STS-45
FIGURE 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
2 IMPACT SITES ON
RCC PANEL #10 WITH
ONE _:1 INCH
(1.9 X 1.6 X 0.17)
NOTE: ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
4 HITS < 1 INCH
5 HITS < 1 INCH
3 HITS < I INCH
N
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4 HITS < 1 INCH
HITS< I INCH
TOTAL HITS = 41
HITS=>1 INCH = 1
15 HITS< i INCH
An expended NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) detonator with an
attached connector coupling ring from the aft umbilical
separation system fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET
umbilical door was opened. A coupler retaining ring from the
same detonator was found adhering to some RTV on the inner
surface of the RH umbilical door. PR PYR-4-12-0151 was taken
by Pyro engineering to document these anomalies. ET/Orbiter
(EO) separation ordnance device plungers 1 and 2 appeared to
have functioned properly. However, the EO-3 plunger was
obstructed by a detonator booster and frangible nut half (PR
PYR-4-12-0150). Because of the obstruction of the EO-3
plunger, a detonator booster from the separation assembly was
allowed to escape and was found in the ET door hinge cavity
(PR PYR-4-12-0150, Page IA}.
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average.
The closeout blanket on SSME #3 was badly torn and frayed from
7:30 to 12:00 o'clock. Three of the sacrificial patches from
this area were missing. Two of these missing patches were
recovered near Pad A during the post launch debris inspection.
The SSME #2 blanket was in good condition although the
sacrificial patch covering the splice at 12:00 o'clock was
missing. The same type of sacrificial patch on the SSME #1
blanket from 5:00 to 6:00 o'clock exhibited significant
fraying.
Two impact damage sites were present on the upper surface of
the right wing RCC panel #i0 (reference PR-STR-04-12-2504).
Laboratory testing could not conclusively define the impact
speed, impact direction, and time of impact (ascent, on-orbit,
etc.).
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited light hazing with a few
small streaks. Chemical analysis was performed on samples
taken from all windows (ref Figure 14 and Section 9.0).
A greater than usual number of damage sites occurred on the
perimeter tiles of Orbiter windows #2 through #6 and on the
tiles between windows #3 and #4. Most of the impact sites were
only surface coating losses or were no more than 1/16th inch
deep. This damage may have been caused by the RTV used to bond
paper covers to the FRCS nozzles or by exhaust products from
the SRB booster separation motors.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure
the surface temperature of three areas on the Orbiter TPS
after landing (per OMRSD V09AJ0.095). Twenty-one minutes after
wheel stop, the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 140 degrees F, the RH
wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 77 degrees F, and the RH
wing leading edge RCC panel #17 was 77 degrees F (Figure 15).
Runway 33 was inspected and swept by KSC EG&G SLF personnel on
1 April 1992 and potentially damaging debris was removed.
89
STS-45
FIGURE 14. CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS
Z
mm
[3 El
Z
g
i
mm
WIPES TAKEN FROM
WINDOWS # 1 - 6
GREY MATERIAL FROM DAMAGE
SITE IN TILE V070-391015-211
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FIGURE 15. TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
RCC PANEL 1777 °
TIME 0645 EST
RCC PANEL 9 77°
TIME ,Q645 EST
ORBITER:
MISSION:
0V-104
STS-45
NOTE: ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
91 NOSECAP 140°
TIME 0644 EST
A post-landing inspection of runway 33 was performed
immediately after landing. The only flight hardware found was
a white plastic parts tag from one of the nose landing gear
tire pressure transducer separation harnesses.
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was
greater than average and the number of hits with a major
dimension one inch or greater was near average when compared
to previous flights (Figures 16-18).
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section I0.
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FIGURE 16: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36 120
STS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-,4) 9 49 14 58
STS-11(41-8) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19(51-A) 14 Se 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-,4) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32(61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
STS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS-41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
STS-39 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
AVERAGE 15.3 87.1 22.4 118. 7
SIGMA 7.3 44.7 10.9 54.9
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 25R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
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Overall view of Orbiter right side
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Thirty-seven hits, of which seven had a major dimension of one
inch or greater, were located along the forward one-quarter of
the lower right surface. Some of the hits may have been caused
by ice from the ET LO2 feedline upper bellows and support
brackets.
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One tile damage site contained an embedded debris particle. Lab
analysis showed the particle (arrow) was composed of paint and
an iron-rich material of unknown origin.
99

2An expended NSI detonator from the aft umbilical separation
system fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET umbilical door
was opened. A coupler retaining ring from the same detonator
was found adhering to some RTV on the inner surface of the door
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Overall view of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical
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The separation ordnance device debris plunger in EO-3 was
obstructed by a detonator booster and frangible nut half.
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Because of the obstruction of the EO-3 plunger, a detonator
booster from the separation system was allowed to escape and
was found in the ET door hinge cavity.
103
L. , r '; .L . ," I_it." L
COLO._ i- HO iL, u_L,r_.rl-I

¢\
t
Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical.
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Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The
closeout blanket on SSME #3 was badly torn and frayed from 7:30
to 12:00.
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Three of the SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) sacrificial
patches were missing. Two of these missing patches were
recovered near Pad A during the post launch debris inspection.
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Two impact damage sites were present on the upper surface of
the RH wing leading edge RCC panel #i0
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Laboratory analysis was unable to conclusively define impact
speed/direction and time of impact (i.e. ascent, on-orbit, etc)
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Vehicle surveillance using television camera OTV-066 showed no
visible damage to the RCC #10 panel at T-I hour 41 minutes
prior to launch
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited light hazing with
a few small streaks
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9.0 DEBRIS _J_I,E I,&B _OR.TS
A total of 9 samples were obtained from Orbiter 0V-104 during
the STS-45 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), Florida (Figure 14). The nine submitted samples
consisted of 8 window wipes and 1 residual sample from a tile
damage site. The samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB} for material composition
and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis
involves the placing and correlating of particles with respect
to composition, thermal (mission} effects, and availability.
Debris sample results and analyses are listed by Orbiter
location in the following summaries.
Orbiter Windows
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of
the following materials:
i. Metallics
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, insulation
3. Cerium-rich materials
4. Paints, dust, rust and salt
5. Organics
6. Earth compounds
Debris analysis provides the following correlations:
I. Metallic particles (brass, aluminum, stainless and
carbon steel alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust
residue, but are not considered a debris concern in
this quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a
known debris effect.
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, and insulation
originate from Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system).
3. Cerium-rich materials originate from Orbiter window
polishing compounds.
4. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; dust
and salt are naturally-occurring landing site products;
rust is an SRB BSM exhaust residue.
5. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending.
This detailed process is more difficult due to small
sample quantity.
6. Earth compounds (calcite and alpha-quartz) originate
from the landing site.
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Orbiter Tile Damage @ire
Results of the Orbiter tile damage site sample indicated the
presence of the following materials:
I. Silica tile
2. Paint
3. Iron-Potassium-Silicon-Aluminum material
4. Iron-Calcium-Silicon material
5. Iron-rich material
Debris analysis provides the following correlations:
I. Dark dense and white fibrous silica tile materials
originate from Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system).
2. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin.
3. The origin of Iron-Potassium-Silicon-Aluminum material
cannot be determined due to small quantity of sample.
4. The origin of Iron-Calcium-Silicon material cannot
be determined due to small quantity of sample.
5. The origin of Iron-rich material cannot be determined
due to small quantity of sample.
Concluslons
The STS-45 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a less than
average degree. The chemical analysis results from post flight
samples did not provide data that points to a single source of
damaging debris.
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB/BSM exhaust,
Orbiter TPS, Orbiter window polishing compound, landing site
products, organics, and paint.
The Orbiter tile damage site sample results provided indica-
tions of thermal protection system (TPS) materials, paint, and
Iron-rich materials that could not be positively identified due
to the small sample size. The lack of sufficient sample for
positive identification of the Iron-rich material prohibits
conclusively establishing a possible debris source.
Future reports will include debris sample results in tabular
form for use in debris source identification by repeatability
of residual results (increase datapopulous). Even though this
mission did not exhibit evidence of a debris concern, the
change in format of analytical data should provide for an
increased sensitivity to trends.
112
10.0 POST __NOR_LIES
Based on the debris inspections and film review, II Post Launch
Anomalies, including one IFA candidate, were observed on the
STS-45 mission.
10 . 1 _ PAD/FACILITY
i. An OIS box and an 8"x14" metal panel lay in the south flame
trench near the flame diverter. The OIS hardware originated
from station 1-17 on the south side of the MLP (near the LH2
skid beneath the overhang). The attach hardware had failed due
to corrosion causing the OIS box to shake loose from the launch
vibration as the vehicle cleared the tower. Pad Operations will
inspect the pad OIS boxes for similar problems. Film analysis
confirmed the OIS box had not impacted the Orbiter right wing
leading edge RCC panel #i0 during liftoff.
10.2 EXTER]NRX,
1. Flight crew observations and on-orbit photographs showed a
conical shaped feature that may be indicative of residual
hydrogen venting from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical and appeared to
originate from the 4-inch recirculation line interface area.
Venting was also visible near the ET intertank and appeared to
originate from the GUCP area. This is a Fluids issue rather
than a Debris concern.
2. The only confirmed anomaly in the intertank area consisted
of I0 TPS divots (4 on the -Y side, 6 on the +Y side) in the
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. Loss of TPS from this
area has contributed to tile damage on the lower surface of the
Orbiter on previous flights.
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
I. All south HDP EPON shim material was intact, but
significantly debonded. The HDP #6 sidewall and bottom plate
EPON shim material was completely debonded.
2. Two ordnance fragments fell from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole
shortly after liftoff (film item E-16) . The HDP #7 Debris
Containment System (DCS) plunger had not seated and was
obstructed by a frangible nut half. Three small particles fell
from the holddown post #5 DCS/stud hole area shortly after
liftoff.
3. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. The EPON shim bottom and
sidewall material was pulled loose by the stud (film item E-7) .
Post flight inspection of the recovered SRB's showed broaching
in the stud hole.
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4. The Hypalon paint on the RH frustum was severely blistered
and peeling the full circumference of the 395 ring frame and
around the BSM's. Layers of MTA adhered to the peeled Hypalon
paint.
10.4 O_BITER
I. Two pieces of SSME closeout blanket sacrificial patch
material, each measuring ll"x16", were found southwest of the
pad apron during the post launch pad inspections. Film analysis
showed a section of SSME closeout blanket sacrificial patch
material originated at SSME #3, fell aft near SSME #I, and
separated into two pieces in the SSME plume. Post landing
inspection of OV-104 revealed three pieces of sacrificial patch
material were missing from SSME #3 and one from SSME #2.
2. The EO-3 debris plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut
half and a detonator booster. A detonator booster from the EO-3
separation system was found in the ET door hinge cavity.
3. An expended NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) with an attached
connector coupling ring from the aft umbilical separation
system fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET umbilical door
was opened. A coupler retaining ring from the same detonator
was found adhering to some RTV on the inner surface of the RH
ET door.
4. Two impact damage sites were present on the upper surface
of the right wing RCC panel #i0 (IFA candidate).
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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Space Shuttle
Photographic and Television
Analysis Project
STS-45
Final Report
May 11, 1992
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1 Debris
2.1.1 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
2.1.1.1 LH2 and LO2 Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras E-O05, E-O06, E-019, E-020, E-025, E-026, E-031, E-040,
E-052, E-076, OTV-O09, OTV-054, OTV-063)
Normal ice debris was noted failing from both the LH2 and LO2 umbilical disconnect areas
at SSME ignition through liftoff. There was less ice falling from the umbilical areas than
has been seen on previous missions. None of the debris appeared to strike the vehicle.
2.1.1.2 Rope-like Debris from Right RCS R4D
"Cameras E-O02, E-O03, E-O15, E-O17)
Figure 2.1.1.2 Rope-like Debris Seen neat- Port RCS at Liftoff
A single, thin rope-like piece of dark debris originated from behind the right RCS (port)
stinger and fell aft at liftoff. The debris was identified by KSC to be a bead of RTV
adhesive used to bond the RCS paper cover to the thruster at R4D. KSC reported that this
event has been seen before. No follow-up analysis has been requested.
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2.0 Summary, of Significant Events AnalTsis
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras EX-O01, E-O01, E-O07, E-O08, E-010, E-011, E-013, E-015,
E-025, E-027 and E-028, OTV-054)
As on previousmissions,severalpiecesof debriswere noted originatingfrom the SRB
flame ductsneartheholddown postsduringand afterSRB ignition.
On camera E-014, a long rope-Like piece of debris was seen near the LSRB HDP M-8 at
liftoff. This appeat_ to be excess rope used to tie down the water baffles at the flame
duct.
On camera E-026, a flat piece of dark debris first seen north of the SRBs, traveled south
past the LSRB and under the left wing during liftoff. See Figure 2.1.2.1.
On camera E-025, multiple small pieces of white debris (possibly from flame duct) traveled
from the aft end of the ET/SRB area toward the LO2 TSM at liftoff.
Several small, light-colored pieces of debris fell aft along the right side of the ET at liftoff
as seen on camera OTV-05&
Velocity measurements were made on two fast-moving pieces of debris that traveled from
the LSRB flame duct toward the RSRB. The trajectory of these pieces were digitized on a
Film Motion Analyzer. One of these particles was seen to exit the flame duct area just after
SRB ignitionand theotherwas observed astheSRB clearedtheMLP. The maximum
velocity of these particles was calculated to be 89 feet per second.
None of theobserved debrisappeared tostriketheorbiter.
Plots of velocity versus time are located in Appendix D Task #7.
Several films were reviewed to determine if individual pieces of debris could be seen by
more than one camera. If this were true, a phototheodolite solution of the trajectory of the
debris could then be calculated. However, none of the observed flame duct debris satisfied
the restrictions of the phototheodolite solution. No follow-up action has been requested.
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Figure 2.1.2.1 Debris Seen at Base of SRBs During Liftoff
On camera E-026, a shiny, flat piece of debris appeared at the base of the SRBs and moved
south under the left inboard elevon during liftoff. The debris did not appear to strike the
vehicle. No follow-up action has been requested
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.2.2 Debris from SRB IIDPs M-5, M-7, M-8
(Cameras E-O07, E-OIl, E-O14, E-O16, E-028 and EX-O04)
Figure 2.1.2.2 Dark Debris from LSRB Stud Hole at HDP M-7
A single piece of dark debris originated from the LSRB stud hole at HDP M-7 and fell aft
after liftoff. See Figure 2.1.2.2. The debris was estimated to be 3 x 0.5 inches in size.
This event was seen on cameras E-016, E-011 and E-028.
On camera EX-004, several small pieces of dark debris appeared to originate from the
LSRB HDP M-5 area after PIC firing as the foot lifted off the holddown post shoe.
None of the above debris appeared to strike the vehicle. No follow up analysis of the
debris seen near the holddown posts has been requested.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.2.3 Epon Shim Material from RSRB Aft Skirt Foot at HDP M-4
during Liftoff
(Cameras E-O07, E-OIl, E-O14, E-O16, E-028 and EX-O04)
Figure 2.1.2.3 Epon Shim Material from RSRB Aft Skirt Foot at
Liftoff
On camera E-007, epon shim material detached from the RSRB aft skirt foot at HDP M--4
and fell into the flame duct at liftoff. See Figure 2.1.2.3. Loose shim material was
previously seen on STS-38 at the same holddown post. No follow up analysis of this
event has been requested.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
Multiplepiecesof debriswere seenfallingaftof theSLV fi'omliftoffthrough ascenton the
launch trackingviews. Most of thedebrissightingswere probably RCS paper or icefrom
theET/Orbiterumbilicals.The debrisdidnot appeartostrikethe vehicle.No follow-up
analysishas been requested.
2.1.3.1 SLV Debris at Tower Clear through Roll Maneuver
(Cameras E-040, KTV-4A )
Several pieces of white debris were seen in the exhaust plume just after tower clear on
camera E-040. On camera KTV-4A, a light-colored piece of debris, f'wst seen near the base
of theverticalstabilizer,fellaftof thevehiclejustafterollmaneuver. The debrisdid not
appearto strikethevehicle.No follow-upanalysishas been requested.
2.1.3.2 Orange Debris from near LO2 Umbilical at 23.7 seconds MET
(Cameras E-212, E-213, E-222)
On cameras E-212, E-213 and E-222, a single piece of orange debris appeared to originate
fi'omtheLO2 umbilicalarea.The debrisbecame entrainedintherecirculationflow and fell
aftat 23.674 seconds.
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2.1.3.3 White Debris near SSME #1 at 31.3 seconds MET
(Camera E-212, E-213, E-222, ET-212 and OTV-054)
Figure 2.1.3.3 White Debris behind SSME #1 Fell Aft and Split into
Two Pieces at 31.277 seconds MET
A single large piece of white debris, first noted behind SSME #1, fell aft and appeared to
split into two pieces at approximately 31.277 seconds MET. See Figure 2.1.3.3. KSC
believed that this debris was part of the closeout blanket patch material found near the pad
after launch.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1.3.4 Orange Debris Aft of LSRB at 71 seconds MET
(Camera E-212)
Figure 2.1.3.4 Orange Debris from Tail End of LSRB Fell Aft at 71
seconds MET
A single piece of orange debris originated new the tail end of the LSRB and fell aft at
approximately 71 seconds MET,
None of the above-mentioned debris appeared to strike the vehicle. Debris falling aft of the
SLV after liftoff has been seen on films and videos from previous missions. Most of this
type of debris has been attributed to ice or RCS paper. No further analysis has been
requested.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.2 MLP Events
2.2.1 Uncovered RCS
(Camera E-017)
Nozzles
Figure 2.2.1 RCS Ports R3D and R3R were Uncovered Prior to
SSME Startup
RCS ports R3D and R3R were not covered with butcher paper prior to the time of launch.
KSC reported that the butcher paper fell off after the March 22 tanking attempt. A waiver
from having to replace the paper was issued to KSC. No follow-up analysis has been
requested.
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2.0 Summar r of Significant Events Analysis
2.2.2 Water Leak in MLP J-Pipes
(Camera E-OIO, E-Oll and E-O16)
A continuous water leak was noted from different sections of the MLP J-pipes both prior to
and after SSME ignition. A similar event was last seen on STS-37. No follow-up analysis
has been requested.
2.2.3 Vapor at LH2 Umbilical Prior to SSME Ignition
(Camera OTV-O09 )
On OTV-009, a slight vapor was noted at the top of the LH2 umbilical prior to ignition. A
review of videos from earlier missions revealed that this event has occurred before. In fact,
there appeared to be less vapor seen at the umbilicals on STS-_t5 than on some earlier
missions. No follow-up analysis has been requested.
2.2.4 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras E-O19 and E-020 )
On camera E-020, TPS erosion was seen at the base of the left OMS nozzle at SSME
ignition. On camera E-019, slight base heat shield erosion was noted between SSMEs #1
and #3 at Liftoff. Base heat shield erosion has been seen on films from most of the
previous missions since reflight. No follow-up analysis has been requested.
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2.2.5 RSRB HDP M-4 Bolt Hang-up
(Camera E O07)
Figure 2.2.5 Bolt Hang-up at RSRB HDP M-4 During Liftoff
A bolt hang-up was noted at the RSRB HDP M-4. The bolt appeared to bend during liftoff
until the aft skirt foot released it, causing the bolt to spring back to a vertical position. See
Figure 2.2.5. A review of previous occurrences of bolt hang-ups since reflight was
conducted. Note that earlier hang-ups have all been at different holddown posts.
MISSION
STS-34
STS-'33
STS-39
STS-43
STS-45
LOCATION OF HANG-UP
RSRB holddow n post M-2
RSRB holddown post M-3
RSRB holddown post M-1 (slight)
LSRB holddown post M-7
RSRB holddown post M-4
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2.2.6 LSRB Firing Cable Remained Attached at Liftoff
(Cameras E-013)
An HDP M-6 firing (PIC) cable remained attached to the LSRB during liftoff. This event
was seen with a RSRB firing cable on STS-37 and two LSRB firing cables on STS-39.
No follow-up analysis has been requested.
2.3 Ascent Events
2.3.1 White Flashes in SSME Plume after Roll Maneuver
(Cameras E-052, E-054, E-057, E-213 and E-222)
Figure 2.3.1 Flash in SSME Exhaust Plume just after Roll Maneuver
Several white flashes were visible in the SSME plume just after roll maneuver. These
flashes were seen from approximately 15 seconds MET through about 27 seconds MET.
This event has been noted on previous missions during this time frame. No follow up
analysis has been requested.
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2.0 Summary of Sig,nificant Events Analysis
2.3.2 Flares in SSME Plume
(Camera E-222)
Figure 2.3.2 Flare in SSME Exhaust Plume at 38.334 seconds MET
Two flares were noted in the SSME exhaust plume at 20.006 and 38.334 seconds MET on
camera E-222. See Figure 2.3.3. FI_es in the SSME exhaust plume have been seen on
previous missions. No follow up analysis has been requested.
2.3.3 Body Flap Motion during Ascent (Task #4)
(Camera E-207)
Slight body flap motion was seen on E-207. When only slight motion is seen, attempted
measurement of the displacement would be too inaccurate to generate useful results. In addition,
the 180" lens used on the camera (E-207) showing the best view of the event was not of a high
enough resolution to accurately quantify the motion.
Apparent body flap motion has been seen on most of the missions since reflight. This event will
continue to be tracked on future missions.
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2.0 Summary' of Significant Events Analysis
2.3.4 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Camera E-205)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB
separation has been seen on nearly all of the previous missions. This event was
conspicuously absent on most of the tracker camera films from STS-45 (due mostly to
mission inclination). Only one camera showed even a slight amount of recirculation on this
mission. Recirculation was first observed at 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at 111
seconds MET on Camera E-205. The time frame for this observed event is similar to those
from previous missions,
See Appendix D Task #1 for a summary of recirculation start and stop times for all missions
since reflight.
2.3.5 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras ET-207, E-205 and E-207)
On camera ET-207, a small white spot was seen to move quickly away from the SSME
area at approximately 106 seconds MET.
On camera E-207, multiple linear optical distortions were noted.
The linear optical effect has been seen on previous missions and is thought to be associated
with the atmospheric refraction generated by SLV shock waves.
STS-45 Final Report
130

2.0 Summary of SignificantEvents Analysis
2.3.6 Orange Pulses in SRB Plume Before SRB Separation (Task #9)
(Cameras KTV-4A, KTV-5, KTV-13, ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-
212, E-204, E-205, E-207, E-208, E-212, E-218 and E-223)
Figure 2.3.6 Orange Pulse in LSRB Exhaust Plume Prior to Normal
Plume Brightening
An orange pulse was noted in the LSRB plume between 117.62 and 118.02 seconds MET
on several tracker cameras° See Figure 2.3.8. On cameras E-204, E-205, E-207, E-218
and E-223, three separate orange pulses were noted in the SRB exhaust prior to normal
plume brightening.
A similar event was seen on STS-42. Frames preceding normal plume brightening on
STS-45 were digitized and analyzed and then compared to those from STS-42. The
objective was to characterize similarities between the two events. The analysis focused on
the relative mean intensity and area of the SRB plume with respect to time. Results
indicated that while minor pulses occurred on STS-42, they were of much lower intensifies
than STS-45.
i
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2.4 On Orbit
2.4.1 Onboard Hasselblad El" Analysis - DT0-312 (Task #6);
(Photographs 45-71-01 thru 45-71-38)
Thirty-eight 70ram Hasselblad photographs of the ET were taken on STS-45. The
exposure and focus for nearly all of the photographs were excellent. The data back was
turned on and timing information was available. These images show the closest views of
the ET after separation of any mission to date.
All measurements were taken with an analog Nikon Shadowgraph and an Optronics
Coscan. Both the LSRB and RSRB BSM bum scars on the O-give of the El" were visible.
Nine divots in the LH2 intertank interface were noted. The largest of these measured 27.8
inches. The combination of high resolution imagery, good lighting conditions, excellent
focus and valid timing data allowed a quantitative determination of the movement of the ET
relative to the Orbiter. The rotation and translation rates, along with the separation
velocity, are discussed in section 2.4.2 of the report.
2.4.2 ET Venting Analysis (Task #10)
The crew of STS-45 reported the appearance of venting from the ET aft umbilical and
intertank areas during the time period following ET separation. Both the 70mm Hasselblad
and the 16ram Arriflex motion picture camera were used to record images of the ET.
Analysis of the handheld 70ram Hasselblad still camera and the 16ram Arriflex motion
pieun_ camera indicated the presence of vapor at the aft umbilical area. One Hasselblad
frame (no. 45-71-031) appeared to show some intertank venting.
A reviewof thetwo earliermissionson which theET containedsimilaramounts ofexcess
propellantwas conducted. No handhcld photographyor umbilicalwellf'flmswere takenon
STS-8. Only the35ram umbilicalwellfilmwas availableon STS-61C. Over the time
periodwhere theET was inthefieldofview,therewas no evidence ofeithertheintertank
oraftumbilicalventingon STS-61C.
Analysistocorrelatecrew obscrvcd eventstothe actualphotographsand filmwas
implemented. An estimatedtimelinemonitoringthesequenceof eventswas generatedand
was includedas Figure2.4.2(A).
All thirty-eight frames from the 70mm Hasselblad camera have been enlarged and printed.
Twenty fi'ames from the 16mm Arriflex were also enlarged and printed. In addition,
selected images from both cameras have been digitized and processed on the VDAS System
to enhance the observed venting. The Arriflex film sequence which showed the ET at full
zoom was also converted from film to video. These images were registered, thresholded
and pseudocolored to emphasize the venting seen at the aft umbilical area. No intertank
venting was observed in this enhanced video.
The 70turn Hasselblads were taken over a period of 9 minutes, 24 seconds starting at
approximately three and a half minutes after ET separation. Standard calculations of
distance from the ET to the Orbiter and their relative velocity were performed. Knowing
the focal length of the camera (250mm), the actual diameter of the ET (333 inches) and the
ratio of the film frame size to the actual field of view, the Orbiter/ET distance was calculated
over several frames. At frame 1, this distance was 554 meters (See Figure 2.4.2 (B); at
frame 38, the distance was calculated as 3272 meters. An average Orbiter/ET distance was
also computed for the time frame when the 16ram Arriflex motion picture film showed the
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
ET at full zoom (a period of approximately 20 seconds). This average measure of the
distance was calculated to be 2337 meters. This implies an overlap of as many as three
I-Iasselblad frames ( nos. 24, 25 and 26).
The aft umbilical venting angle was measured on five different digitized frames of the
16ram Arriflex motion picture film and was found to be varying between 51 ° and 86 °. See
Figure 2.4.2 (C). While the intertank venting was only captured on one frame of the
Hasselblad film, this venting angle appears to agree with crew es_mates of 90* to 150 °.
See Figure 2.4.2 03). The actual measured angle on frame no. 45-71-031 was
appxoximately 100 °.
The tumble rate of the ET was calculated to be about 0.2°/second over the first seven
minutes of photographic coverage and 2.7°/second over the final two minutes. This
increase in the tumble rate appears to correspond with the crew's fn'st observations of the
intertank venting.
The rotation rate was calculated to be about 0.7°/second over the first minute of coverage.
A maximum rotation rate of 3.0°/second occurred between the eight and nine minute mark
of photographic coverage. This again appears to imply that the intertank venting reported
by the crew did indeed affect the motion of the ET. See Figure 2.4.2 (E)
A CAD overlay of the ET was placed on the fin'st frame of the 70ram I--Iasselblad sequence
in order to locate the source of the aft umbilical venting. The best estimate of the projected
origin was determined to be the LH2 umbilical area. Given limitations in the field of view
of the photograph and the CAD system, the vent source could not be traced to a specific
line.
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Figure 2.4.2 (B) Earliest View of External Tank at 12 minutes, 25
seconds MET
(70ram Hasselblad Frame No. 45-71-001)
The first Hasselblad image of the External Tank was taken from a calculated distance of
approximately 554 meters. This is the earliest that the ET has been photographed and was
the only Hasselblad image on which the aft umbilical venting could be seen, probably due
to a combination of factors: Orbiter to ET distance; camera shutter speed; and exposure
time. (Film type was Kodak color positive 5017.) Note that this view also clearly shows
the burn scars on the O-give and four divots along the LH2 intertank interface. Reference
the timeline in Figure 2.4.1 (A) for the observed sequence of events.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
Figure 2.4.2 (C) Venting Observed from Aft Umbilical Areas at
Approximately 18 minutes, 30 seconds MET
(16ram Arriflex Frame F510 - 1323)
These images of the same frame show venting from the aft umbilical area as seen by the
16ram Arriflex motion picture camera. The top image shows the original frame, while the
lower one emphasizes the venting with pseudo-color. While the External Tank was within
the field of view at full zoom (a period of approximately 20 seconds), the aft umbilical
venting appeared as three distinct pulses. An enhanced film-to-video conversion of this
sequence of images showed the actual venting to be continuous. No intertank venting was
observed on this film.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
Figure 2.4.2 (D) Intertank Venting seen at 20 minutes, 2 seconds
MET
(70ram Hasselblad Frame No. 45-71-031)
Processing enhancements to the 70mm Hasselblad imagery revealed one frame where the
intertank venting reported by the astronauts was visible. The frame appeared to show the
projected source as being in the vicfifity of the intertank umbilical carrier plate area. Crew
estimates of the venting cone angle varied between 90 ° and 150 °. The intertank venting
may have been the reason that the ET rotation rate seemed to change substantially during
this period of time. See Figure 2.4.2 (E) for more detail.
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Frame 45-71-031
20 minutes, 2 seconds MET
Frame 45-71-034
20 minutes, 32 seconds MET
Frame 45-71-035
21 minutes, 4 seconds MET
Frame 45-71-036
21 minutes, 34 seconds MET
Figure 2.4.2 (E) Sequence of Four Images Showing Change in the
Rotation Rate of the ET at 21 minutes MET
(70ram Hasselblad Frame Nos. 45-71-031,034, 035, 036)
Calculated rotation rates of the External Tank appeared to vary while the last ten Hasselblad
frames were shot. This sequence of photographs compares the rotational position of the
ET as a function of time. The intertank venting seen by the crew may have been a factor in
this observed change of the ET rotational velocity. Assuming that the Orbiter's motion
stayed relatively constant with respect to the External Tank, the ET also appeared to be
wobbling (in a direction normal to the field of view) over this sequence of frames.
Reference Appendix D Task #10 for details.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.5 Landing Events
2.5.1 SSME #3 Beta Blanket Tear
The post-landing inspection of the Orbiter showed tears in the SSME #3 beta blanket.
Similar damage had been seen on the SSME #2 beta blanket on STS-39. This event is not
considered anomalous.
2.5.2 Damage to RCC on Right Wing and Nose Area (Task #11)
The post-landing inspection of the Orbiter revealed damage to the lower right nose area (tile
nos. V070-39015-211 and V070-39015-212) and to the RCC panel #10 near the leading
edge of the right wing. A review of launch tracker films E-052, E-054, E-057, E-059, E-
205 and E-207 and all the landing videos was conducted to determine whether or not the
damage could have been attributed to a previously seen event. No apparent debris source
was seen on the films that might have led to the damage. Figure 2.5.2 (A) shows a general
view of the damaged areas. Figure 2.5.2 (B) shows detailed views of the RCC damage.
Figure 2.5.2 (A) Tile Damage Locations on the Orbiter
This photograph taken during the post-landing inspection of the Orbiter shows a general
view of the area where RCC damage was seen. See Figure 2.5.2 (B) for more detailed
views of the damage.
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Right Wing Damage Nose Area Damage
Figure 2.5.2 (B) RCC Damage to the Orbiter Right Wing and Nose
Area
The photographs in Figure 2.5.2 (B) show the extent of the damage on both the leading
edge of the right wing and the underside of the nose area. The strike on the lower right side
of the Orbiter (Tile # V070-39015-211) was analyzed. A section of the black outer layer of
the file was pressed into the white inner layer from some object striking the tile; however,
no residue was found in the cavity.
Post-retrieval inspection of the SRBs also revealed two areas of damage on the aft skirt area
of the RSRB.
No definitive sources of debris that might have caused damage were identified from the
tracker camera films at either launch or landing.
2.5.3 Debris in Umbilical Well Doors
The post-landing inspection of the Orbiter also revealed a pyro detonator booster located in
the right ET door aft hinge cavity along with smNler metal debris. The problem report
generated by this event is located in Appendix H.
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2.5.4 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
2.5.4.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film
(Camera E-I O01)
Camera EL-009 was used to determine the main landing gear sink rate. This particular view
showed the aft side of the orbiter from the end of the runway. A point on the top and bottom of
the right main landing gear was chosen for each frame. Four points were also chosen at the left
and right edges of the runway for the first and last frames. These were digitized to detect any
significant camera motion. Raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame.
The wheel position was computed and a linear regression was applied on the normalized vertical
distance vs. time data to determine actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 2.0 ft/sec.
Nose gear touchdown was determined using camera ML-005. Points on top of both the left and
right main landing gear (used for scale and to criminate camera motion) as well as a point on the
nose wheel were digitized for each frame. Raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale
at each frame using the known distance between the two main landing gear wheels. The nose
wheel position was computed and a linear regression was applied on the normalized vertical
distance vs. time data to determine actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 2.9 ft/sec.
See Appendix D Task #3 for details.
2.5.4.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
(Camera KTV-33)
Data from camera KTV-33 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. An area near the
nose gear was used as a reference scale. The position of the main gear as a function of time was
found by taking the difference between the raw vertical positions of the main landing gear and the
edge of the runway with the same X coordinate over 32 frames. Using the scale as a function of
time, these differences were converted to feet. A least squares regression line was calculated from
the data and the slope was used as the average sink rate. This rate was found to be 1.0 ft/sec.
The sink rate for the nose gear was also calculated using 32 frames digitized from camera KTV-33.
A linear regression of the data was calculated in the same manner as above. The slope of this line
was used as the sink rate and was found to be 3.0 feet per second.
See Appendix D Task #3 for details.
Results from the f'dm analysis are considered better than video because of the higher spatial
resolution. The quantization error inherent in the use of the video makes this analysis insufficient to
meet the 0.1 feet per second precision required by the OMSRB.RCNSD500002DV51.P.001.
2.6 Other Normal Events
Other events seen on the STS-45 launch views that have been seen on previous shuttle
flights include:
Overpressure wave during SRB ignition, debris in the exhaust cloud on the MLP after
liftoff, vapor from both SRBs' stiffener rings, ET aft dome outgassing, charring of the ET
aft dome, ice and vapor from the T-0 umbilical disconnects, and SRB plume brightening
prior to SRB separation.
STS-45 Final Report 141

Appendix B. MSFC Photographic Analysis Summary
142

N_onal/_ronaulics emcl
C, _ 81ram RIgM C4mtw
Marshall _ Right ConWr. Alabama 35812
ENGINEERING
SPACE SHUTTLE
PHOTOGRAPHICANALYSIS
STS-45
REPORT
i_- it-i, 4e4 mew. oelebw life )
143
k
ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS REPORT
STS-45
FINAL
PREPARED BY :
J. HIXSON, D. BUSING, B. VIGER, W. LANGLOIS
PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS/ROCKWELL/HSV
MANAGER,
JAcKsoN
LAUNCH AN_ FLIGHT OPERATIONS/ROCKWELL/HSV
Bo
APPROVED BY:
OFF,/MSFCIEP55
LINDLEY-ANDERSON, MSFC/EP55
144

STS-45 ENGINEERING PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT
A. GROUND CAMERA COVERAGE
B. ONBOARD CAMERA COVERAGE
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
B. HOLDDOWN POST M-4 STUD HANG-UP
C. SRB HOLDDOWN POST M-7 DEBRIS
D. DEBRIS FROM SRM PLUME
E. ET DIVOTS
F. ET VENTING
Vm ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS
A. T-0 TIMES
B. ET TIP DEFLECTION
C. SRB SEPARATION TIME
D. SRB HOLDDOWN POST SHOE ROTATION STUDY
APPENDIX A - FIGURES
APPENDIX B - INDIVIDUAL FILM CAMERA ASSESSMENT *
APPENDIX C - INDIVIDUAL VIDEO CAMERA ASSESSMENT *
Photographs in the individual camera assessments are
representative photographs and are not necessarily
photographs taken from this particular launch.
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April 15, 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
Space Shuttle Mission STS-45, the eleventh flight of the
Orbiter Atlantis, was conducted March 24, 1992 at approximately
7:14 A.M. Central Standard Time from Launch Complex 39A (LC-39A),
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive photographic and
video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to determine
proper operation of the ground and flight hardware. Cameras
(video and cine) providing this coverage are located on the fixed
service structure (FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39A
perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and downrange tracking
sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-45 included, but were not limited to the
following.
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
1. Holddownpost blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
There were two special test objectives for this mission.
a. SRB holddown post shoe rotation quantification
b. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty-eight of fifty-nine
requested cameras as well as video from twenty-three of twenty-
three requested cameras. The following table illustrates the
camera data received at MSFC for STS-45.
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-45
?0n Video
MLP 26 0 0 3
FSS 7 0 0 3
Perimeter 3 3 0 6
Tracking 0 15 0 11
Onboard 3 0 1 0
Totals 39 18 1 23
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments
of the video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Photographic coverage of STS-45 was considered good.
However, the long range trackers were partially obscured by
clouds. Cameras E-9 and E-34 both experienced a speed
malfunction prior to liftoff. Camera E-220 did not record data
due to a film magazine problem.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly.
However, camera E-302 onboard the left SRB did not record SRB
water impact. Also, the astronauts recorded the ET after
separation with 70mm and 16mm hand-held cameras to evaluate ET
TPS integrity. Thirty-eight frames of the ET were recorded on
the 70mm film.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off, debris induced streaks in the
SSME plume, and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle
during ascent, which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire
detectors, purge barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape.
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b. Holddown Post M-4 Stud Hang-up:
Figure one is a film frame taken from camera E-7 showing
holddown post M-4 stud hang-up. Approximately 12 inches of the
stud appears to remain extended until the SRB aft skirt clears
the stud. The stud then moves 1.5 inches laterally, at which
time it then drops into the HDP bolt catcher. The stud pulled
loose four pieces of EPON shim material from the base of the shoe
as the vehicle lifted off.
c. SRB Holddown Post M-7 Debris:
Figure two is a film frame taken from camera E-11 showing
the second of two events of frangible nut material falling from
holddown post M-7 hole. These debris are typical of previously
observed frangible nut material.
d. Debris From SRM Plume:
Figure three is a film frame showing one piece of debris
noted coming from the SRM plume during ascent at 084:13:14:53.06
UTC. This debris is possibly thermal curtain tape.
e. _ Divots:
The 70 mm photography of ET after separation showed
several TPS divots. The photography covered all sides of the ET.
Two large divots were noted in the char on the aft dome. Several
divots were located at the intertank/LH2 tank interface near the
+Y axis. These divots are shown in figure four.
f. ET Venting:
Venting of the ET at the 17" disconnect and intertank areas
was reported by the astronauts while performing DTO-312. Venting
of the LH2 17" disconnect was recorded on film. This venting was
recorded on the 16mm arriflex camera and appeared to pulsate in
intensity. No timing was available on this film. One frame
(001) of the 70mm Hasselblad camera also recorded this venting at
13:26:05 UTC.
A comparison of the venting plume was made with a plume
resulting from a 700 SCIM leak of N204 from the Orbiter's RCS on
STS-42. Figures five and six provide a side-by-side comparison
of these two plumes from similarly scaled images. The ET venting
is from frame 1323 of the 16mm film. The RCS plume size is
unknown since it expands off the frame. It shows that the ET
plume is lesser than the RCS plume. However, it should be noted
that differences in background and image quality may affect the
visible plume size.
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An attempt was made to locate the source of the plume at
the LH2 disconnect. The 16mm film did not provide the required
resolution. Figure seven is a CAD model overlay of frame 001
from the 70mm film. Figure eight represents the plume boundaries
and bisector normal to the viewing vector. Figure nine shows the
disconnect with an intersecting plane defined by the plume
bisector and view vector. Figure ten is a disconnect layout
drawing with the resulting intersection line of the disconnect
and the plane showing the measured location of the venting
source.
A review of previous flight film showed that no venting at
either the intertank or disconnect areas has ever been recorded.
Table IV-I provides a summary of this review along with DTO
acquisition times after ET separation. It should be noted that
the ET was visually acquired much earlier on this mission than on
previous flights.
TABLE IV-I
ET VENTING PHOTOGRAPHIC SUMMARY
DTO-312 TIME
(Sec after seD.)
883
DTO-312
Qbservations
No venting noted
Umbilical Well*
OBservations
No venting noted
from disconnects
STS-29 850 No venting noted
Good view of GUCP
STS-32 No venting noted
from disconnects
STS-34 No timing
STS-35
No venting noted
Film not available
STS-37 No timing No venting noted
Good view of GUCP
STS-39
STS-40 No timing
Film not available
No venting noted
Good view of GUCP
m
No venting noted
from disconnects
STS-42 883 No venting noted
STS-43 911 No venting noted
Good view of GUCP
STS-45 745 Venting observed from
LH2 disconnect
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* Coverage from ET sep. to approximately separation + 2 minutes
A review of the STS-45 camera usage timeline shows that the
16mm arriflex camera was used during the time span that the 70mm
stills were taken. The 16mm motion picture camera recorded the
venting during this time while the venting was not apparent on
the stills. Therefore it cannot be stated from film that no
venting occurred since all previous DTO film reviewed were of
70mm stills.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the
SRB holddown posts numbers M-5 and M-6. These cameras record the
explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I EXl
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
084:13:13:39.999
084:13:13:40.000
084:13:13:40.001
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31.4 inches. Figure eleven is a data plot
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-45 was determined to be
084:13:15:48.14 UTC taken from camera E-207.
d. SRB Holddown Post Shoe Rotation Study:
A study was performed on this mission to determine the aft
skirt/shoe rotation effects at T-Zero due to the radial biasing
of the MLP holddown post to 0.060 inches.
Cameras EXl, EX4, E-27 and E-28 were used to provide close-
in coverage of the shoes and holddown posts M-l, M-5, M-3 and
M-7, respectively.
Figure twelve shows the locations of the cameras and
holddown posts and direction of "horizontal motion" relative to
the attached plots.
Figures thirteen and fourteen show the target positions of
the motion data taken relative to a stationary target on the MLP.
Figure thirteen represents posts M-1 and M-5. Figure fourteen
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represents posts M-3 and M-7.
The following table provides the RMS data accuracy for each
post measured in inches.
Post
M-i +.018 +.017
-.017 -.015
M-3 +.013 +.012
-.014 -.002
M-5 +.024 +.018
-.023 -.017
M-7 +.012 +.012
-.012 -.013
The motion data are presented in figures fifteen through
twenty-six. These da_a have been filtered to remove the noise
from the interactive digitization process.
151
Figure ]
Ho]ddown Post M-4 Stud Hang-up
Figure 2
Frangible Nut Nat_o_ia] From Holddown l'ost M-7
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Figure 5
Plume Comparision
Figure 6
Plume Comparision
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Figure 7
CAD Model Over]ay of Frame 001
FJ gure 8
Representation of Plume Boundaries
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Camera Locations
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|Figure 13
Target Positions of Holddown Post M-I and M-5
Figure 14 ' _ ....
Target Positions of Ho]ddown Post M-3 and M-7
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Space Transportation Systems Division
Rockwell InternationaJ Corporation
12214 I.akewoocI Boulevara
Downey. CaJifomm 90241
Roci,::v,,e[!
intern  or,&i
May 4, 1552 In Reply Refer to 92MA2014
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ly'adon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA)
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration,Transmittal of the Rockwell
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-45 Mission.
The System IntegrationContractor hereby submits the Engineering
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the_Space Shuttle
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document
(NSTS 08244).
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated
to determine ground and flightperformance. Cameras (cineand video)
providing thiscoverage are locatedon the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites,and
uprange and downrange tracking sitesforthe STS-45 launch conducted on
March 24, 1992, at approximately 5:13 am (PST) from the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) and forthe landing on April2, 1992 at KSC (3:23am PST).
Rockwell received launch filmsfrom 85 cameras (62 clne,23 video)and landing
Rims fi'om26 cameras (9 cine,17 video)to support the STS-45 photographic
evaluation effort.One film,E220 was not obtained due to camera malfunction.
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP,
FSS and tracking cameras were good. However, due to the accumulation of
clouds,many of the tracking video and films reviewed were obstructed afterthe
vehicle went through the cloud cover. This hampered analysis and possible
detectionof debris and/or anomalies.
Overall,the films showed STS-45 to be a clean flight.Several piecesofice from
the ET/ORB umbilicaiswere shaken looseat SSME ignition,but no damage to
the Orbiter Thermal ProtectionSystem (TPS) was apparent. The usual
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aftdome and the SRB
stiffenerrings and dissipatedaRer the completion of the rollmaneuver. No
Vapor was observed in the vicinityof the rudder/speed brake at liftoff.Charring
of the ET aftdome and recirculationwere visibleand normal. Booster
Separation Motor (BSM) firingand SRB separation alsoappeared to be normal.
(Packing Sheet No. DM92-13454)
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were
activated at approximately 1 second Missions Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal.
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume
impingement. Both TSM umbilicalsreleased and retractedas designed. The ET
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound.
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH 2 umbilical hydrogen
dispersal system hardware.
STS-45 was the sixthflightwith the optimized attach linkin the SRB holddown
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The linkis designed to
increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the holddown
bolt ejectionvelocityunchanged. This prevents frangiblenut fragments and/or
NSI cartridgesfi-omfallingfi'omthe DCS, while not increasing the probabilityof
a holddown bolthang-up.
Three major or significantevents were observed or identified.A disturbance in
the lateral acceleration strip chart data at Ifftoff led RocXwell to suspect there
had been a bolt hangup on one of the SRB holdown support posts. Also the crew
reported venting of the El' after separation and after landing (during the post
],_dln_ inspection) two divots were found on the Orbiter right wing leading edge
RCC (reinforced carbon-carbon) panel #10. These events and other events noted
by the Rockwell film/video users during the review and analysis of the STS-45
photographic items are summarized in the following comments. These events
are not considered to be a constraint to next fligh_
1. During lifloff, a disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at
Rockwell-Downey indicated a possible bolt hangup on one of the SRB
holddown posts. This was confirmed when film E-7 was reviewed and the
post M-4 bolt was seen at hangup at liflofr The bolt also deflected during
lifloffuntilthe aftskirtfootrosesufficientlyto releaseit,causing the boltto
spring back toitsoriginalverticalposition.This event has been noted on
previous missions. No follow-up actionhas been requested or planned.
2_ A potential inflight anomaly was reported by the crew at ET separation.
While .I_.x£orming DT0-312 the astronauts observed venting or vapors from
the aft disconnects (oxygen or hydrogen) of the El'. After landing, views of
the ET after separation from the Orbiter consisted of one 16 mm film and 38
still 70 mm flames (OV-104 was not equipped to carry umbilical cameras).
Venting (conical in shape) was seen coming from the _ umbilical area on
the 16 nun film only. KSC and MSFC reported that venting was visible in
frame #1 of the 70 mm film. A CAD/CAM reconstruction/enhancement of
frame #1 (70 nun) provided by MSFC showed the venting coming from the
LH 2 umbilical No evidence of venting or vapors from the ET intertank has
been seen on either the 16 mm or 70 mm films. All photographic products
available have been reviewed by engineering personnel supporting the
investigation. No additional action(s) are currently planned.
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The landing of STS-45 occurred on runway 33 at KSC. After landing, two
significantdivotswere found on the Orbiter right wing leading edge RCC
(reinforcedcarbon-carbon) panel #10. The divotswere down to the firstlayer
ofclothand were 1.9 x 1.6 x 0.17 (deep)inches and 0.8• 0.7 • 0.2inches in
size. In an _ to determine the source(s) of the damage, 9 landing films,
17 landing video cameras, and selectedlaunch Rims from 8 perimeter
cameras and 5 tracking cameras were reviewed. No anomalies were
observed that could be relatedto the wing damage. Events normally
observed on previous flightswere seen from these cameras. No additional
action(s)are planned.
,
On cameras E-011, E-016 and E-028, a dark piece ofdebrisoriginatesfrom
the stud hole at HDP M-7 and fellaftafterliRof_ No follow-upactionis
planned forthisitem.
Q
A singlethin,rope-likepiece of debris originatesfrom behind the rightRCS
stingerand fellaftintothe SSME area priorto liftoffThe debriswas
identifiedas tape from the RCS and was seen on cameras E-001, F._002,
E-003, E-004, E-015, and E-017. Itisnot considered an issue and no follow-up
actionisplanned
On cameras E-212, E-213, and E-222, a largewhite pieceof debriswas noted
behind SSME#1 fallingaftand splitintotwo piecesafterthe rollmaneuver.
This material isprobably the two piecesof SSME closeoutblanket patch
material found near the pad afterlaunch. No follow-upactionisrequired.
On cameras KTV-4A, KTV-_A, KTV-13, ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212,
E-204, E-205, E-207, E-208, E-ZI2, E-208, And E-223 three orange pulses were
noted in the SRB exhaust plume priorto SRB separation. These observations
have been seen on previous missions and are understood at be burning of
propellant impurities. Itis not considered an issue and no follow-upis
planned.
A piece oforange debris(possiblybaggie material) noted from the LO 2
umbilical area. The debrisis entrained in the recirculationflow and falls
aft at approximately 23.5 seconds MET. This event was noted on cameras
E-212, E-213 and E-222 and is not considered an issue.
Several typicalevents reported on other launches were observed on STS-45.
These events are not a concern, but are documented here forinformation
only:
• Ice debris fallingfrom the ETIOrbiter Umbilical disconnect area.
- Debris (Pad, insta-foam,Water trough) in the holddown post areas and
MLP
• Butcher paper fallingfrom the RCS
• Rec/rculationor expansion ofburning gases at the aftend of the SLV
• SlightTPS erosionon the base heat shieldduring SSME start-up.
• Throat plug material which was ejectedfrom the SRB flame duct north
of the vehicle at liftofr;
• Body flapmotion during the maximum dynamic pressure (Max-Q)
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to
those of previous missions.
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• Charring of ET ai% dome.
• SRB plume brightening, prior to SRB separation.
• Linear optical distortions, possibly mused by shock waves or ambient
meteorolgical conditions near the vehicle, after the roll maneuver.
• A Large piece of EPON shim material which debonded from the
holddown post M-4 aft skirt foot and fell into the flame duct during liRoff
(probably mused by the bolt hang-up which occurred on the same post).
• Holddown post shoe rotation during lifloff which was observed to be
s'mfilar to that seen on previous missions.
• Two RCS jets, R3D and R3R, that were seen to be missing their paper
covers prior to launch - an event which was known and waived;
10. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances
between the leit SRB and the ET vent ,mhlilc,! have been verified. The films
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies
were observed far the SRB body trajectory.
11. Cameras E7-16 and E27-28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No.
DV08P.20 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during littoff to
verify nozzle to holddown post drift clearance.
m.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
This letter is of particular interest to Mr. W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and
Mr. R. W. Hautamaki (WE3) at JSC. The Integration Contractors contacts are
W. S. Trueman at (310) 922-1200 or R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679.
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
Space Systems Division
System Integration
RR:vss
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